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Abstract—In order to perform Quantum Cryptography proce-
dures it is often essencial to ensure that the parties of the com-
munication are authentic. Such task is accomplished by quantum
authentication protocols which are distributed algorithms based
on the intrinsic properties of Quantum Mechanics. The choice of
an authentication protocol must consider that quantum states are
very delicate and that the channel is subject to eavesdropping.
However, even in face of the various existing definitions of
quantum authentication protocols in the literature, little is known
about them in this perspective, and this lack of knowledge
may unfavor comparisons and wise choices. In the attempt to
overcome this limitation, in the present work we aim at showing
an approach to evaluate quantum authentication protocols based
on the determination of their quantum communication comple-
xity. Based on our investigation, no similar methods to analyze
quantum authentication protocols were found in the literature.
Pursuing this further, our approach has advantages that need to
be highlighted: it characterizes a systematic procedure to evaluate
quantum authentication protocols; its evaluation is intuitive,
based only on the protocol execution; the resulting measure is
a concise notation of what resources a quantum authentication
protocol demands and how many communications are performed;
it allows comparisons between protocols; it makes possible to
analyze the communication effort when an eavesdropping occurs;
and, lastly, it is likely to be applied in almost any quantum
authentication protocol. To illustrate the proposed approach,
we bring results about its application in ten existing quantum
authentication protocols ( data origin and identity authentica-
tion). Such evaluations increase the knowledge about the existing
protocols, presenting their advantages, limitations and contrasts.
Index Terms—Quantum Communication Complexity, Quan-
tum Authentication Protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Cryptography comprehends both Quantum Me-
chanics and Information Theory. As the classical Cryptogra-
phy, its objectives goes beyond confidentiality and include
methods to provide data integrity, non repudiation and au-
thentication [1]. In particular, authentication concerns the
procedures to verify the origin of some data or to verify the
identity of a party in the communication. For this reason,
authentication is subdivided in data origin authentication and
in entity authentication.
In the Quantum Cryptographic domain, authentication is
performed by quantum authentication protocols which are
distributed algorithms based on the intrinsic properties of
Quantum Mechanics. Quantum authentication protocols dif-
fer from the classical ones in at least three aspects: they
are not based in some computational difficulty; they don’t
allow information copy; and, they may allow eavesdropping
detection [2]. In association with quantum key distribution
protocols, they play an important role in providing trusty
quantum communication in the presence of eavesdroppers.
Given the importance of authentication in quantum com-
munication, several protocols for quantum authentication have
been proposed in the literature [2]–[11]. They use different
procedures and resources of the Quantum Mechanics to per-
form the authentication, such as: EPR pairs, superposition,
catalysis, unitary operations, among others.
Considering that quantum states are very delicate [12], a
crucial concern in the adoption of a certain quantum authenti-
cation protocol is the number of communications performed.
A protocol that minimizes such number but that still ensures
secure authentication can be considered well suited to practical
scenarios of Quantum Cryptography. However, little is known
about the existing protocols in this perspective and this lack
of knowledge can unfavor comparisons and wise choices of
quantum authentication protocols.
Taking into account these concerns, in this paper we pro-
pose an approach of evaluation and classification of quantum
authentication protocols based on the determination of their
Quantum Communication Complexity – a measurement of the
amount of communications carried out between the parties in
order to accomplish some distributed task [13]. As far as we
know, no similar approaches to analyze quantum authentica-
tion protocols were found in the literature.
The main result of our proposition is that it turns out to
be possible the determination of the resources required by
a certain protocol and the realization of systematic compa-
risons between different quantum authentication protocols. It
is important in practical scenarios of Quantum Cryptography
because authentication protocols can be ranked and chosen
according to the communication resources available.
Furthermore, this paper presents the application of our
proposed methodology in ten quantum authentication proto-
cols. This illustrates how the approach can be applied and
brings new results about the characteristics and advantages of
quantum authentication protocols existing in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the basics concepts of the Quantum Communication
Complexity. Section III presents the formalism and concepts
regarding quantum authentication protocols. Section IV intro-
duces the approach proposed and Section V shows the results
of our analysis in some existing quantum authentication proto-
cols. Lastly, Section VI draws the conclusions and suggestions
for future work.
II. QUANTUM COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
With the advents of telegraph and telephone in the mid-
twentieth century, there was an urge to perform the tasks of
store, transmit and process data. Motivated by these practical
problems, the Information Theory was proposed [14]. Shannon
laid its foundations with an article entitled “A Mathematical
Theory of Communications” [15] where he defined precisely
what is information and how to measure it, and also demon-
strated the existence of codes to error-free communication
when the channel capacity is respected.
It is important to emphasize that the necessity to commu-
nicate arises when two or more parties need to collaborate
jointly to accomplish a task that none of them can perform
alone. In Information Theory, the objective is to study how this
communication must be performed – which codes to use, how
to deal with noisy channels, and so on. Another perspective
that can be taken into account when a communication needs
to be carried out is what needs to be communicated. This is
the object of study of Communication Complexity [16], [17].
With the growing adoption of quantum channels in commu-
nications, Yao [18] was a pioneer in considering the concerns
of Communication Complexity in this domain. It was needed
to understand the implications of a communication that makes
use of Quantum Mechanics resources with the purpose to
answer a central question: “Are there any advantages in
the quantum communication model when compared to the
classical existing ones?”.
In the study of Quantum Communication Complexity it is
considered that two parties, say Alice and Bob, are interested
in evaluate a certain f(x, y), where x is known only by Alice
and y is known only by Bob. Alice and Bob must exchange
information through a supposed error-free quantum channel
according to some protocol which can be understood as a
distributed algorithm. The main interest in this scenario is the
amount of communication necessary to the parties accomplish
their task.
According to the resources of Quantum Mechanics available
to Alice and Bob, there are three variants of the Quantum
Communication Complexity model that can be considered:
1) Yao’s model [18], [19]. This model considers a quantum
channel who will enable exchanges of qubits between
Alice and Bob. Each party of the communication inte-
racts with the channel via unitary operations, depositing
qubits that can be accessed by the other part also
via unitary operations with the channel. When Alice
and Bob determine precisely the value of f(x, y) the
protocol ends and the number of communications is
considered. In this variant, the Quantum Communication
Complexity of a function f is denoted by Q(f);
2) Cleve and Buhrman’s model [20]. This model con-
siders the existence of prior entanglement between the
parties and allows the exchange of information via a
classical channel. In this variant, the number of en-
tangled pairs is not considered, just the number of
classical bits exchanged. In this variant, the quantum
communication complexity of a function f is denoted
by C∗(f). It is important to emphasize that this model
is well suited to analyze protocols where superdense
coding and teleportation are used;
3) Hybrid Model. This variant combines the characte-
ristics of the previous two: there are entangled pairs
available to the parties of the communication, a quantum
channel, and also a classical channel. In the determi-
nation of the Quantum Communication Complexity the
entangled pairs used are not considered, just the further
information exchanged. In this variant, the Quantum
Communication Complexity of a function f is denoted
by Q∗(f).
In all the three variants considered, we assume that the
parties must determine precisely the value of f(x, y), i.e.,
the function f must be evaluated with probability of error
equal to zero. A more detailed description of these models
and alternative definitions that enables a limited error can be
found in the surveys of Wolf [13] and Brassard [21].
The theory of Quantum Communication Complexity has
still open questions that need to be enlighten, such as about
the existence or not of an exponencial gap between Classical
and Quantum Communication Complexity for all functions.
Despite this, applications of Quantum Communication Com-
plexity are growing every day. Results on quantum formula
[18], finite automata size [22], data structures [23], and on
security of quantum key distribution [24] have already been
developed.
The most interesting aspect of Quantum Communication
Complexity is that the advantage provided by Quantum Me-
chanics has been established rigorously. This is in sharp
contrast with the field of Quantum Computing, in which it
is merely believed that Quantum Mechanics allows for an
exponential speedup in some computational tasks [21].
III. QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptogra-
phy. It is concerned with assuring that a communication is
authentic. In the case of a single message, the function of
the authentication is to assure the recipient that the message
is from the party that it claims to be from. In the case of
an ongoing interaction, two aspects are involved: first, at an
initial time, the objective is to assure that the two parties are
authentic, that is, that each is the party that it claims to be; after
that it must be assured that the connection is not interfered in
such a way that an eavesdropper can masquerade as one of
the two legitimate parties for the purposes of unauthorized
transmission or reception [25].
Aiming to provide these two functions, authentication must
be achieved in two branches:
1) Data Origin Authentication. Enables the recipient to
verify that the message has not been tampered en route
and that it originate from the expected sender;
2) Identity Authentication. Enables the recipient to verify
that a sender is who his claims to be. If some security
conditions are guaranteed, it also enables the recipient to
ensure that no one else is impersonating the true sender.
To illustrate how authentication works consider a simple
symmetric key model of authentication consisted of a sender
(Alice), a receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve) as illus-
trated in the Figure 1. The objective in this model is to enable
Bob to authenticate a message sent by Alice. To do so, in a
previous moment Alice and Bob securely share a key k that
will be used to authentication.
Alice encrypts the original message m with the key k using
an algorithm E, producing mc = E(m, k) (Step 1). Alice
sends mc to Bob through an insecure channel which is being
eavesdropped by Eve (Step 2). It is assumed that Eve can
observe all the information transmitted from the sender to the
receiver and also that, in general, she knows even the original
message, but not the key used to encrypt it.
There are two kinds of possible attacks by the opponent:
the impersonation attack in which Eve sends a message in the
hope that it will be accepted by the receiver Bob as a valid one;
and the substitution attack in which he opponent observes a
transmitted message and then replaces it with another message.
Upon receiving a message, Bob will use his key k and a
decryption algorithm D to try recover the original message,
i.e., he will perform D(mc, k) (Step 3). If no tampering
occured, Bob will obtain a pair 〈m, 1〉 where m is the original
message sent by Alice and 1 indicates that the authentication
was successful. Otherwise, Bob must discard and ask Alice to
send again [1], [26].
In the quantum setting, despite the same idea, authentication
is performed sightly differently. Information is now physical
and for that reason the laws of the Quantum Mechanics must
be obeyed. In this domain, authentication is thus performed
by quantum authentication protocols which define how to
represent information and what to be sent by each party.
To send a message m to Bob according to a quantum
authentication protocol, Alice encodes m with a certain code
before sending it. However, if the same code is always used,
Eve can simply create errors that the code cannot detect, so
they must use one of a family of codes which detect different
kinds of errors. The key k now tells them which code to use.
Since Eve doesn’t know k, she doesn’t know which errors the
code detects, and no matter what she tries to do, she has a
good chance of getting caught. Besides, Alice and Bob must
also encrypt the quantum state in order to avoid undetectable
changes in the quantum state performed by Eve [3].
In comparison with the classical protocols, the quantum
ones differ in several potentially useful ways. The primary
contrast between them regards how information is represented
and exchanged – while the classical protocols are restricted
to bits, in the quantum scenario the parties can use qubits,
entangled particles and even bits. Another difference regards
the action of the eavesdropper. In the classical scenario, Eve
would break into the classical storage area and copy Bob’s
key without leave any evidence. After that, she would use it
to communicate with Alice who might now realize anything
wrong for quite a while. However, in the quantum scenario it is
improbable to occur. The no-cloning theorem not only makes
undetected theft of key more difficult, but also protects a stolen
key from dissemination [10]. Furthermore, in the quantum
domain, authentication implies encryption which is not always
true in the classical scenario [3].
Quantum authentication plays a major role in Quantum
Cryptography because they precede the execution of the so
called quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. Such proto-
cols provide the conditions to the parties produce a shared
random secret key known only to them, which can then
be used to encrypt and decrypt messages [27]. Since QKD
protocols require previous authentication and considering the
recent successful results about their implementation over long
distances [28], there was a motivation for the presentation of
a formal definition [3] and for the proposition of quantum
authentication protocols in the literature [2], [4]–[11].
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
As stated in the Section III, the purpose of the interaction
of the two parties in a quantum authentication protocol is to
enable the verifier Bob to evaluate D(mc, k) = 〈m, valid〉,
where m is the original message sent by Alice. Introducing
some formalism, a quantum authentication protocol can be
represent as a function fA : M ×K → {0, 1} that evaluates
to 1 if D(mc, k) = 〈m, valid〉, and to 0 otherwise. To make
a distinction between data origin and identity authentication
protocols, we will denote the corresponding functions by fD
and fI , respectively.
Different quantum authentication protocols can implement
fD and fI [2]–[11]. Therefore, it is natural to look for ways
to compare them in order to choose one that is better or more
adequate to certain available resources. Despite the differences
between the implementations of all these protocols, they share
a common characteristic – communications are performed
between the parties.
Taking the communications between the parties into account
and remembering that quantum states are delicate [12] and also
that the channel is subject to eavesdropping (that may affect
the quantum states), a quantum authentication protocol can be
considered good if it minimizes the number of communications
between the parties but still assures a secure authentication. In
order to meet the stated criteria, we present an approach based
on the analysis of the quantum communication complexity of
a quantum authentication protocol, defined as follows:
Definition 4.1: (Quantum Communication Complexity
of a Quantum Authentication Protocol) Let P be a quantum
authentication protocol between two parties A and B that
computes a function fA :M ×K → {0, 1} (that can be fD or
fI ). The Quantum Communication Complexity of fA under
P is the minimum number of communications between A and
B to (i) allow both parties to compute fA(mc, k) where mc
and k are the worst case over all inputs M ×K (i.e., the cost
of the protocol is maximal), and to (ii) avoid an eavesdropper
Eve to create any m′ such that fA(m′, k) = 1 or to evaluate
fA(mc, k) = 1.
Regarding the assumption that the computational power
is unlimited, the security that avoids Eve to create any m′
such that fA(m′, k) = 1 or to evaluate fA(mc, k) = 1 is
desired to be unconditional. An exponentially low probability
of success in the attacks is also acceptable, but there are
quantum authentication protocols that still rely on unproven
computational difficulties. Protocols with this last mentioned
characteristic have weaker security when compared to the two
others.
It is important to emphasize that the definition of quan-
tum communication complexity of a quantum authentication
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Figure 1. Symmetric Key Model of Authentication.
protocol used by our approach is sightly different from the
original one of quantum communication complexity. In the
original definition if one of the parties is able to determine the
evaluation of the function, it is enough to communicate it to
the other party. However, in our definition it is not allowed: the
presence of the eavesdropper avoids Alice to send m directly
to Bob or to perform any communication that may reveal k.
Another consideration that must be made regards the re-
sources of Quantum Mechanics required by each protocol. In
the determination of the quantum communication complexity
of a quantum authentication protocol, each protocol will be
evaluated according to one of the three variants – Yao, Cleve
and Buhrman, or Hybrid – presented in the Section II. Mo-
reover, for reference, the quantum communication complexity
will be denoted in function of the size of the key and of the
message.
Our approach, therefore, can be described in a straightfor-
ward way considering the definitions previously presented in
the Sections II and III. To evaluate a quantum authentication
protocol firstly it is necessary to determine the Quantum
Mechanics resources required – quantum bits, classical bits
and/or previously shared entangled pairs. After that, with a key
of n bits and a message of m bits (if they exist), perform an
execution of the protocol supposing that no impersonation nor
substitution attacks occur. From this execution, it is necessary
to verify how much information was exchanged between the
parties to compute fA. The information exchanged must be
expressed in terms of n and m. As the final step, according
to the resources identified in the initial moment, the informa-
tion exchanged must be represented in accordance with the
respective model, i.e., using Q, C∗ or Q∗.
Upon analyzing a quantum authentication protocol accor-
ding to our approach, the final result is a concise notation of
what resources it demands and how many communications are
performed, considering a key and a message of a generic size.
If the exact number of communications may vary depending
on certain situations, this approach also allows an asymptotic
notation where the upper and lower bounds as well as best,
average, and worst cases can be individually analyzed.
The asymptotic notation can also be used to measure the
effort necessary so the parties can recover from an eaves-
dropper attack. If the attack is detectable, it is necessary to
measure the resources to recover from it and to still ensure
the authentication. A certain quantum authentication protocol
may require the parties to discard and restart from the initial
point while other can reuse the non-tampered data, saving on
the number of communications. If the evaluation of a protocol
will be made considering the action of an eavesdropper, its
quantum communication complexity will be denoted as QE ,
C∗E , or Q
∗
E according to the most adequate model.
The comparisons between quantum authentication protocols
are also possible thanks to the proposed approach. Following
the procedures previously described, the evaluation of the
quantum communication complexity of each protocol must
be performed independently. After that, the results obtained
must be grouped according to the respective model and, then,
ordered. The lower result in each group indicates the protocol
that requires less communications to provide authentication,
i.e., that best fits the previously state criteria. It is also
important to emphasize that no comparisons between protocols
classified under different groups are possible – the resources
involved are of different nature and their comparison can lead
to misleading conclusions.
Based on our investigation in the literature, no similar
methods to analyze quantum authentication protocols were
found. So, the approach presented contributes to overcome this
limitation. Pursuing this further, there are advantages of our
approach that need to be highlighted: it characterizes a system-
atic procedure to evaluate quantum authentication protocols;
its evaluation is intuitive, based only on the protocol execution;
the resulting measure is a concise notation of what resources
a quantum authentication protocol demands and how many
communications are performed; it allows comparisons between
protocols; it makes possible to analyze the communication
effort when an eavesdropping occurs; and, lastly, it is likely
to be applied in almost any quantum authentication protocol.
V. EVALUATING THE QUANTUM COMMUNICATION
COMPLEXITY OF QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOLS
In order to illustrate the proposed approach, this section
shows the evaluation of the quantum communication com-
plexity of quantum authentication protocols existing in the
literature. The results obtained and the conclusions achieved
are presented in the following subsections according to the
purpose of the protocol – data origin authentication or identity
authentication.
A. Results for Data Origin Authentication
The first proposal of a quantum authentication protocol
was made by Barnum et al. [3]. In their protocol, Alice and
Bob use purity testing codes and make a prior agreement on
some parameters that will be used (two keys, purity code, and
syndrome). After that, they carry out the protocol that enables
Bob to authenticate the message sent by Alice in a single
communication to him. Considering that this protocol requires
only qubits exchanges between the parties, in our approach its
analysis will be made with the Yao’s model. If a message has
m qubits, Alice will send Bob a quantum coded message of
m + n qubits, where n is the size of a security parameter as
a key. Therefore, the quantum communication complexity of
this protocol is Q(fD) = m+ n.
In the quantum data origin authentication protocol proposed
by Yang et al. [4], Alice wants to send a message composed
by a sequence of pure states. To do so, she encodes it with a
Goppa code using parameters previously securely shared with
Bob. The encoded message that will go through the channel
has twice the qubits of the original one. When Bob receives
such message he decodes it with an unitary operator built
from the parameters of the Goppa code in use. The decoding
procedure uses up to five registers where, in particular, the
fifth (stores the original message) and the third (stores an
authentication flag) must be measured. It should be noticed
that this protocol only requires qubits exchanges which implies
the analysis of its Quantum Complexity Communication with
the Yao’s model. Each message with m qubits is codified with
a Goppa code using 2 ·m qubits, therefore, Q(fD) = 2 ·m.
In conclusion, the security of this protocol relies on the
computational hardness of building the decoding operator
without the knowledge of the security parameters.
The quantum authentical protocol proposed by Curty and
Santos [5] uses a code to protect the message that will be sent
through the channel. Alice and Bob start the protocol already
sharing a singlet state. When Alice wants to send a bit of the
message to Bob she prepares two qubits in the state |φi〉, where
|φ0〉 and |φ1〉 are orthogonal states and represent the classical
bits “0” and “1”, respectively. After that Alice encodes the
qubit along with her part on the singlet and send it to Bob.
Upon receiving the message, Bob uses a decoding operator
and is able to detect, with high probability, when a tampering
occurred and when the message is authentic from Alice. In
this protocol, the parties use qubits and a previously entangled
pair, but no classical communication is performed between
them. This implies that the Hybrid model must be used in
the analysis. As explained before, to each bit of the classical
message that Alice wants to send Bob, she must use a two
qubits state. Hence, the quantum communication complexity
of this protocol is Q∗(fD) = 2 ·m.
Li and Zhang [6] present a message authentication protocol
that uses previously shared EPR pairs between the parties.
When Alice wants to send a bit to Bob she codifies it in a
quantum system before sending to Bob. She uses a redundant
coding, in which two qubits (in Bell states) codes one bit
of information, and performs a CNOT operation with her
half of the EPR pair. When Bob receives such state, he
also performs a CNOT operation (on his half and on the
received qubit) followed by a measurement. Bob is able
to recover the original message sent by Alice and also to
detect eavesdropping. In the described protocol the parties use
entangled pairs and exchange qubits, but they don’t perform
classical communication. It is possible to conclude, thus, that
the model to analyze it is the Hybrid one. Moreover, Alice
uses a codification where 1 bit is codified in 2 qubits. This
way, the quantum communication complexity of this protocol
is Q∗(fD) = 2 ·m.
In the four protocols analyzed, two of them were evaluated
under the Yao’s variant and the other two under the Hybrid
variant. Regarding the first group, the Barnum et al. [3] pro-
tocol may have smaller quantum communication complexity
than the protocol of Yang et al. [4] when n < m, but the
security issues must be considered. The other two protocols
have equivalent quantum communication complexity. It is also
important to notice that none of the protocols analyzed make
use of classical communications.
B. Results for Identity Authentication
In the identity authentication quantum protocol proposed
by Kanamori et al. [7], [29] Alice and Bob share a prior
key K = {θi : 0 ≤ θi < pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n} composed of a
sequence of angles. Alice generates a random n-bit string RA
and encodes it into a system |ψRA〉 of n qubits in orthogonal
states (|0〉 or |1〉, for instance). In sequence, Alice rotates
each qubit |ψA,i〉 according to an angle θi ∈ K , encrypting
the original quantum state. After that, she sends the resulting
state to Bob. Since Bob knows K , he decrypts the received
state, performs a measurement, and, therefore, recovers RA.
Next, Bob generates a random n-bit number RB and a session
key KS = {θ′i : 0 ≤ θ′i < pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n}. In sequence, he
encodes RB in a quantum system |ψRB 〉 and encrypts it with
K and KS before send it to Alice. Alice decrypts the state
with K and performs an exclusive-OR (XOR) operation with
the resulting state and RA. She sends the resulting state to Bob
who decrypts with KS and obtains a superposition |ψRA⊕RB 〉.
The last step performed by Bob is a XOR with RA. If he
retrieves RB , he can successfully authenticate Alice’s identity.
As it can be seen, the protocol proposed by Kanamori et
al. just uses a quantum channel and no prior entanglement. In
our approach, thus, it will be used the Yao’s model to analyze
it. Considering that the key K shared between the parties has
n bits, and 3 quantum states of dimension n are exchanged
in this protocol, the resulting complexity is Q(fI) = 3 · n.
One disadvantage of this protocol is that if tampering occurs,
a complete repetition of the procedures must be carried out.
Despite of that, it generates a session key that can be used
later by the parties of the communication.
Zeng and Guo [8] present an identity authentication quan-
tum protocol that is based on symmetric cryptography with
EPR pairs previously shared between the parties. In their
protocol, Alice and Bob share a prior key K1 of n bits.
From the key, they derive a serie of measurements MK1 in
a rectilinear or diagonal basis. Initially, Alice performs a serie
of measurements in her half of the EPR par with MK1 . In
his turn, Bob measures his half with MK1 and with a random
series of measurements M . If eavesdropping occurred, Alice
and Bob can detect by showing each other certain results
of their measurements in common. Bob and Alice therefore
change their results via classical symmetric key cryptography
and can authenticate the identity of each other.
The described protocol is able to authenticate both the
identities of Alice and Bob. To do so, it uses EPR pairs and
classical cryptography. Regarding this last point, in particu-
lar, unconditional security cannot be guaranteed. Taking into
account the resources required by this protocol, its quantum
communication complexity must be evaluated with Cleve and
Buhrman’s variant. The communications performed between
Alice and Bob are encrypted versions of their measurement
results who require 2·n+s bits of classical information, where
s is a security parameter. Thus, according to our approach,
the quantum communication complexity of this protocol is
C∗(fI) = Ω(2 · n).
Another identity authentication quantum protocol was pro-
posed by Li and Barnum [2]. This protocol uses EPR pairs
between the parties as the identification token. In this protocol,
Alice and Bob previously share n EPR pairs and create an EPR
pair associated to each of them. These auxiliary pairs will be
measured in the Bell basis at the end of the process. If the
Alice party is legitimate and no tampering occurred, Bob will
get one of the Bell states previously expected.
One interesting aspect of the protocol of Li and Barnum
is that no previous key is shared between the parties, just
entangled qubits. It should also be noticed that no classical
communication is required although qubits exchanges occurs.
Therefore, this protocol must be analyzed according the Hy-
brid model. The resulting quantum communication complexity
is related with the numbers of communications required to
produce the EPR pairs: Q∗(fI) = 2 · n.
Zhang, Li and Guo [9] present a quantum identity authen-
tication protocol that uses previously shared EPR pairs and a
quantum channel. In their protocol, Alice acts as an identifier,
Bob as a verifier, and they share an angle θ that will be helpful
in the prevention of impersonation. When the protocol starts,
Alice and Bob rotate 2 ·k entangled pairs by θ. After that, Bob
creates k′ (k′ ≤ k) qubits in an arbitrary pure state, denoted by
|ψi〉, and send it to Alice who will perform CNOT operations
controlled by her half of the entangled pair. Alice sends that
particles back to Bob who uses his corresponding particles of
the entangled pair to do a CNOT operation, making |ψi〉 turn
back to the original state. Bob then performs a measurement
in the basis {|ψi〉 , |ψi〉⊥} and checks if the results obtained
are in accordance with what is expected. If the measurements
passes the test, Bob can authenticate Alice.
In this protocol, the operations performed are the strength
against eavesdroppers. Besides, the EPR pairs shared between
the parties are intact after the execution and can be reused
to help Alice authenticate Bob, for instance. To analyze this
protocol, the Hybrid variant will be used since it makes use
of previously entangled qubits and of a quantum channel.
Considering that the state |ψi〉 has n qubits and that it is sent
to Alice and then back to Bob, the quantum communication
complexity of this protocol is Q∗(fI) = 2 · n. It is also
important to emphasize that no classical communication is
carried out.
Barnum [10] proposes a quantum identity authentication
protocol that exploits the phenomenon of entanglement-
catalyzed transformations between pure states. Alice and Bob
share a catalyst state |φ〉, and there are incommensurate states
|φ1〉 and |φ2〉 such that in the presence of the catalyst, |φ1〉
can be converted to |φ2〉 while retaining |φ〉. When Alice
wants to authenticate, Bob prepares |φ1〉 and sends half of it to
her. They go through the steps, involving local measurements,
one-way communication of measurement results, and local
operations conditional on those measurements results, which
convert |φ1〉 to |φ2〉. This protocol involves qubits exchanges
and classical communication and, thus, the model to analyze
it is the Hybrid one. However, despite the security of this
protocol, the number of communications may vary depending
on the steps to transform a certain |φ1〉 into a |φ2〉. For
this reason, the quantum communication complexity of this
protocol cannot be precisely determined. It just can be said
that Q∗(fI) = Ω(n) and that this may not be a tight lower
bound.
The protocol proposed by Zeng and Zhang [11] uses a
trusted center to help the legitimate users to authenticate
identity. The trusted center sets up a quantum channel between
Alice and the center and between Bob and the center. The
center generates the same two entangled pairs to Alice and
Bob, keeping half of each. Similarly to BB84, Alice and
Bob measure their particles with a randomly chosen basis
(horizontal-vertical or diagonally polarized) and share the basis
used for the measurements, creating a session key – so, in this
protocol, both authentication and QKD are implemented. The
resources used are previously entangled pairs, quantum and
classical communication what implies in the analysis accor-
ding to the Hybrid model. The number of communications
cannot be determined precisely because it depends on the size
of the key. Apart from it, a lower bound of Q∗(fI) = Ω(4n)
can be determined. It is important to mention that this protocol
is provably secure.
Once the evaluation of the quantum communication com-
plexity of each quantum identity authentication protocol was
performed, it is possible to draw some conclusions about them.
A common characteristic of all of these protocols is that the
number of communications performed is a polynomial in the
size of the key. Regarding the models considered, just the
protocols from Li and Barnum [2], Zhang et al. [9], Barnum
[10] and Zeng and Zhang [11] fall in the same variant. The
protocols of Li and Barnum [2] and Zhang et al. [9] have
equivalent quantum communication complexity. Considering
the Barnum’s protocol [10], since its quantum communication
complexity is highly related to the states used, it is not
possible to determine its performance in contrast with the
others. But, despite the security, the Zeng and Zhang’s protocol
[11] is the one which may perform more communications
among the protocols analyzed. Additionally, just the protocol
of Kanamori et al. protocol [7] makes use exclusively of qubits
exchanges.
VI. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper we presented an approach to evaluate quantum
authentication protocols based on the determination of their
quantum communication complexity. Our proposal characteri-
zes a systematic procedure to analyze such protocols, allowing
comparisons between them and also providing a concise
notation of what resources a certain quantum authentication
protocol demands.
So far to our knowledge, no similar approaches were found
in the literature. The proposed approach aims to overcome
this limitation and also contributes to provide a big picture of
the existing quantum authentication protocols. In this context,
it helps the identification of the efforts necessary to the
proposition of better protocols and may lead new researches
in this way.
In the attempt to illustrate the proposed approach, we
surveyed the literature and analyzed ten existing quantum
authentication protocols. From the quantum data origin au-
thentication protocols, we concluded that two of them have
analogous quantum communication complexity according to
the Hybrid model and the other two, analyzed under the Yao’s
model, may distinguish according to the size of the key used
in one of them. In the quantum identity authentication proto-
cols covered, it was not possible to determine precisely the
quantum communication complexity of all of them, but lower
bounds were given in such cases. The resulting analysis helped
in the identification of two protocols with equivalent quantum
communication complexity and concluded that the Zeng and
Zhang’s protocol [11] may require the most communications
between all of them. In both categories of quantum authentica-
tion protocols investigated, it was possible to conclude that few
of them exploits classical communications. The evaluations
performed helped in increase the knowledge about the existing
literature.
In future works we aim to extend our research to other
existing quantum authentication protocols. We also would like
to increment the presented analysis, including results about
the quantum communication complexity when attacks occur.
An open question resultant of this work, in particular, is if
it is possible to provide a secure authentication with quantum
protocols approximating the Holevo bound, i.e., optimizing the
number of communications performed.
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